

CRIS, S STUDY

VN DANGERS

AUG 6, 64

Laos - SVN

At ^{risk} ~~status~~ in SVN; possible losses, damage, unfavorable developments:

1. Open, all-out DRV attack in Laos; in SVN.
2. " " China " " " ; " " .
3. Military successes by VC.
4. Increased Terrorism by VC.
5. Demand security, increased scope of control by VC.
6. Increased infiltration, support by DRV in SVN; Laos.
7. Movement of PRC into BPL parts of Laos.
8. " " DRV " " " " " .
9. Movement of PRC into DRV? [Bad? Or, ~~supposed~~
make DRV look "foreign," "unauthoritative"]
10. Attacks by DRV, PRC on US forces.
11. VC terrorism vs. US troops; mission.
12. Retaliatory attacks in SVN by DRV.

13. Assassination, coup replacing Khanh:

- a) Paralyzing gov
- b) demoralizing forces, pop, gov
- c) pressure for deals (below); demand US leave SVN.
- d) violent, uncontrolled action vs. DRV.

14. Above or other events leading to:

- a) increased pressure by: gov; forces; mil. leaders; pop.
- b) Emigration by leaders
- c) defections by troops; by units.
- d) deals by premier leader with VC.
- e) pressures for neutralism; ^{gov} co
- f) pressures for coalition with VC; negotiated settlement with DRV.
- g) pressures for partition?
- h) violent measures against DRV without US approval.
- i) slowdown, stoppage of pacification, efforts against VC.

15. In demoralized state of SVN, big VC successes:

- a) Military victories
- b) Open VC "gov" & VC "territory."

c) Switch of allegiance by province chiefs, landlords, major towns ^{units.}

16. Direct "deal" with VC or DRV by Khanh or other major leader.
17. General SU presence in DRV (?) ; e.g. with millions.
18. Reduced ability to conduct limited sea or air ops vs. DRV.
SAMs, air defence, ...
19. SU-PRC rapprochement.
20. ALG demand that US leave.
21. Actions by Khanh, or part of gov, or a new leadership :
 - 1) toward much more repressive, unpopular gov
 - 2) toward ineffective, destabilizing, unpopular pacification programs
 - 3) repression of minorities
 - 4) Unauthorized attacks on DRV ; or moves north, or into Laos or Cambodia
 - 5) Denouncing US ties ; moves toward
 - a) "neutralizing"
 - b) DRV-VC
 - c) other allies: ^{e.g.} French

22. Allied moves: Apart on US allies:

2) denunciation of US, by a neutral, an ally, or UN; as

1) aggressor

2) ~~was~~ illegal, immoral

3) unwarranted intervention

4) violating treaties, commitments.

b) Moves behind US back, or indirectly US, to "solve" problem
(by France; UK; SVN; ...)

c) Loss of faith in US support: ^{Philippines;} Thailand, Japan; Korea,
Taiwan; NATO? Weakening or break of alliances.

Among ^{our} ~~the~~ risks are

Events giving US the appearance of:

- a) Reneging on precise commitments.
- b) Retreating from commitments, abandoning ally, or conveying against US interests, or failing to respond to limitation of attack because of:

- 1) fear of conflict with DRV
PRC
SU

- 2) fears raised by specific threats, warnings, by enemy (S).

- 3) weakness, inability to do otherwise effectively.

- 4) Domestic, intra-alliance, or intra-governmental ^{politics}

- 5) Moderate costs.

- c) haphazard military action; "

- d) incompetent decision-making or implementation.

- e) Rashness, heedless acceptance of risks: 1) to SVN
2) escalation

- f) highly provocative, unwarranted actions, justifying:

- a) DRV/PRC/VC retaliation

- b) open attacks in SVN; loss.

- g) "outrageous" inconsistency to:
- a) collateral damage
 - b) costs of escalation to SVN, Laos
 - c) attitudes of allies
 - d) legality; treaties; charge of aggression
 - e) desires of SVN population.

vacillation

- h) ~~hesitant~~ irresolution; indecision; internal contrasting, leading to inaction or cross-purposes or ineffective compromises.
- i) acting blindly, without plans, clear intermediate and long-term goals, clearheaded analysis, good forecasts, imaginative construction of alternatives.
- j) bad decision-making; bad, unrealistic or wishful estimates, unsophisticated view of political-military aspects, bad judgments, snap decision; inflexible goals. ^{"wrong" or}
- k) Double-dealing; lack of frankness to allies, or SVN; lying, concealing truth, w. r. t.: allies
Congress
public

l) inviting/encouraging/tempting attacks, by weakness or vulnerability

k) Culpable surprise; failure to foresee (assign "reasonable, prudent weight to") actual events, failure to prepare.

l) failure to investigate desires of SVN, Laos public, or leaders.

m) Symmetry of methods, style, morality with Comm Bloc

n) interest only in conservative "stable" governments in area, with strong prohibition for military

o) unreal inhibitions w.r.t. legality

VN/neutral attitudes

allied wishes

ready to make, ineffective action in support of commitments, or US interests, or in response to Comm provocation.

p) failure to perceive or respond vigorously to "clear"

US national interest, w.r.t. "challenge", provocation, opportunity.

24. New form of civil war, insurgency in SVN; Laos.

25. Neutrality, failure to cooperate, by Thailand.

26. US actions furnishing undesirable precedent, example, for:

- a) Allies (Turkey)
- b) Bloc countries (in and outside)
- c) Third parties

60-61

How did DDP ops in Laos mesh with ops in Cuba?

Was DDP overextended?

Didn't Lorton experience give DDP experience for Bg of Pigs?

Measures now:

1. Prepare for "audit, balancing of books, "grading,"
"look at the record," reckoning.

a) Look coldly at our performance, its appearance,
to date; ~~to~~ w.r.t. possible "appearance" above.

b) What can be misinterpreted?

c) How can 'record' be improved?

2. Start acting "for the record"; as if books were going
to be examined, opened, shortly.

3. Have a plan; realistic goals, comprehensive analysis,

appropriate, effective means:

4. Have realistic, sound forecasts.

5. Have comprehensive & coordinated approach, to
military, economic, political aspects.

6. Show awareness of ^{SVN} administrative, internal problems
in accepting US advice & influence, implementing it.

7. Imagine and evaluate (at high level) relative badness
of different circumstances under which: a) US leaves SVN
b) effort against VC/DRV ceases.

8. Start draining deception ^{and countermeasures} from programs;
increase information to public, allies, in context
of realistic plan and forecasts.